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Summary findings
Education attainment levels increased dramatically for  *  The social rates of return  across levels ol schooling
Mexico's labor force in the 1980s and early 1990s. In  were more uniform in 1994 than in 1984, suggesting a
parallel, the country experienced a pronounced  increase  more efficient assignment of education spending. At the
in earnings inequality from 1984-94,  reflected in a  same time, the distribution of spending on education
higher dispersion of wages and an absolute decline in the  became more egalitarian, as per student spending in
real incomes of less educated, poorer Mexicans. This  higher education declined markedly compared with per
increased wage dispersion presents policymakers with a  student spending at the primary level. This surprising
tradeoff between efficiency considerations (favoring  coincidence in the pattern of spending on education was
increased spending on higher education) and equity  only possible because Mexico started out with a very
considerations (favoring a more equal distribution of per  distorted resource allocation in education that was both
student spending) in the allocation of fiscal resources to  highly inequitable and inefficient. As Mexico's
education.  policymakers are on the way to correcting these
Lachler concludes that the best way to deal with this  distortions, the opportunities for avoiding the equity-
equity-efficiency tradeoff is to encourage greater private  efficiency tradeoff within Mexico's centralized education
participation in higher education. His main findings are  framework will become progressively exhausted.
that:  *  There is little reason to expect the pace of
* The accumulation of human capital during 1984-  technological change, which appears mainly responsible
94, as proxied by education attainment, was  for raising wage dispersion and the relative returns on
accompanied by a more equal distribution of education  higher education, to abate. Efficiency considerations
attainment levels over that period and, thus, exerted an  dictate that Mexico should respond by devoting more
equalizing effect on the distribution of incomes. The  resources to higher education. However, the federal
increased income inequality observed over that period  budget, which traditionally has financed the lion's share
appears to be caused by an increased rate of skill-based  of higher education costs in Mexico, is unable to
technological change, whose transmission to Mexico and  accommodate additional spending on higher education,
other developing countries may have been facilitated by  while spending cuts elsewhere in the education sector are
the increased openness of their economies.  bound to raise serious equity questions. Thus, to avoid
The greater dispersion of wages observed in Mexico  falling behind in terms of human capital accumulation,
during the past decade raised the rates of return on  greater private sector participation is necessary, at least
investing in higher education, reversing the traditional  in terms of cost recovery from the main beneficiaries of
pattern where primary education exhibits the highest  higher education.
rates of return.
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The education  attainment  of Mexico's labor  force increased  dramatically
during  the 1980s  and early 1990s,  contrasting  markedly  with the uneven  accumulation  of
physical capital. At the same time,  the rates of return on investments  in different  levels
of schooling  show  significantly  less dispersion  than they did a decade  ago. This suggests
that investment  in education  has been taking  place in a more socially  efficient  manner.
Another  visible development  over the last decade,  however,  has been  a significant
increase  in earnings  inequality,  accompanied  by an absolute decline  in the real incomes of
the less educated,  poorer  members  of society. This comes as something  of a surprise  in
light of the great equalizing  properties  generally  attributed  to education,  but is a
phenomenon  that in recent years  also has been  observed  in other developing  as well as
developed  countries.
The increased  wage dispersion  presents  policymakers  with two challenges:
the more immediate  one is how to respond to the decline  in real incomes facing a large
share  of the country's population. The other  related  challenge,  with implications  for the
country's long-term  growth  prospects,  concerns  a tradeoff in the allocation  of resources  in
education  and is especially  acute  in relatively  centralized  education  system such as
Mexico's. Since  the increased  wage  dispersion  raises  the rate of return from investing  in
higher education,  economic  efficiency  considerations  would  dictate  a response  that
devotes relatively  more  resources  to higher  education  versus other levels. A resource
reallocation  to that effect,  however,  means  transferring  resources  toward segments  of the
population  that are already  better off,  thus conflicting  with equity  considerations.
Mexico's policymakers  were able  to avoid this policy dilemma  over  the
last decade:  as shown  below, the allocation  of public spending  on education  has become
somewhat  more egalitarian  and, at the same  time, the social rates of return associated
with different  levels of education  have become  more uniform. This happy coincidence
was possible  only because  Mexico  started  out with a very distorted  resource  allocation  in
education. As past resource  misallocations  are corrected,  however,  the opportunities  for
further  improvements  in resource  allocation  within  the existing,  centralized  education
framework  are progressively  exhausted. This is likely to result in increasing  tensions in
the allocation  of fiscal  resources  -- between  efficiency  considerations  that argue for more
resources  to higher education  and egalitarian  considerations  that argue  for a more equal
distribution  of transfers  within and outside  the education  sector. This paper argues that
the most promising  way of dealing  with these tensions  is by seeking  to clarify  the roles
for the public  and private  sectors in education  and by encouraging  greater  private
participation  in higher  education.2
A.  The Growth of Education Attainment 1
Education attainment levels increased rapidly in most developing
countries since the 1950s; Schultz (1988). While Mexico also partook in that
development, earlier studies had identified a significant lag in its education indicators.
Londonto  (1996), for example, points to an "education deficit", according to which the
Latin American countries in general, and Mexico in particular, have approximately two
years less of education than would be expected for their level of development (as
measured by per-capita incomes). Elias (1992) finds that education was the most
important source of labor quality improvement in Latin America between 1950 and 1970,
but points out that such improvements did not take place to the same extent in Mexico.
This changed dramatically in the 1980s, as shown in the scatter diagram below.
Figure 1 describes the relation between income per capita and average
years of schooling of the population aged 15 years or more, using stacked cross-country
data for the years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1985 and 1990.2  Mexico's level of education
'The following  discussion  primarily  focuses  on the evolution  of education  attainment  levels  as measured
by years  of schooling,  on the assumption  that  the quality  of education  has  remained  more  or less
constant.  Although  it is of great interest  in this  context,  information  on the quality  of education  in
Mexico  is very  scarce. The most common  measures  of "quality"  are based  on input  measures,  (e.g.,
real expenditures  on education  per student,  student-teacher  ratios,  or class-density  variables)  or
secondary  performance  variables  (e.g., evolution  of repetition  and desertion  rates). On the basis  of
these  measures,  Mexico  also  has  performed  comparatively  well  over  the last few decades. These
measures  are not very satisfactory,  however,  as they  reflect  many other  influences  in addition  to the
quality  of instruction  as reflected  in  the acquisition  of knowledge  and  skills. A comprehensive
education  survey  was conducted  in Mexico  in 1995  as part of the Third  International  Mathematics
and Science  Study  (TIMMS)  that  may have  yielded  important  data  to permit  correlating  the preceding
education  sector  characteristics  with  academic  achievement  levels  to obtain  a better understanding  of
the determinants  of education  quality  in Mexico. That data  set has not been  made  publicly  available.
2 The scatter  diagram  in Figure  1 is based  on 317 observations  from five  different  years. The observations
pertaining  to Mexico,  ordered  by date,  are as follows:
Ave. Schooling  (years) Ln (GDP  per capita; 1980  US$)
1960  2.76  7.95
1970  3.68  8.29
1980  4.77  8.71
1985  5.20  8.63
1990  6.72  8.67
The  trend  line  represents  the least  square  regression  line  given  by:
S =  -13.17 +  2.28 Ln(GDPcap)  Adj. R2 = 0.68
(-18.7)  (26.0)  t-values  in parentheses
The  application  of Ramsey's  RESET  test to this regression  equation  failed  to detect  a specification  error;
unlike  with  the alternative  specification  of type: S = a  + bX + cX 2. However,  coefficient  stability
tests  indicated  that  the trend  line  is not constant  across  decades.  This  is reflected  in the upward  drift
of the coefficients  associated  with  the dummies  in the following  equation:
S  =  -13.20 + 2.21 Ln(GDPcap) + 0.023DUM70  + 0.525DUM80 + 0.833DUM 85 + 0.997DUM90
(-19.0) (25.4)  (0.1)  (1.7)  (3.0)  (3.6)
Adj.  R 2 = 0.70,  t-values  in parenthesesFigure 1
Cross-Country  Relation between  Education  Attainment and GDP
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Source:  Penn  World  Tables,  mark  5.6,  and  Barro-Lee  data  set  on international  measures  of  schooling.
The  chart  is  based  on  stacked  cross-country  data  for 1960,  1970,  1980,  1985  and  1990.  Country  coverage  varies  according  to data  availability.
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attainment in 1960 was significantly below the world mean for countries at similar levels
of economic development.  Although Mexico's education attainment increased steadily
over the following two decades, it continued to remain below the international trend line.
In the 1980s, however, the growth of education attainment in Mexico accelerated,
permitting it to catch up to international standards by 1990; where its placement in Figure
1 is slightly above the trend line.
The closure of Mexico's education gap vis-a-vis the rest of the world was
hastened in part by the country's economic stagnation. Mexico's real GDP per capita in
the mid-1990s was roughly the same as it had been in the first half of the 1980s. Had
Mexico continued to grow at the same pace as in the 1960s and 1970s (and assuming that
the gains in education attainment remain the same), its 1990 placement in Figure I would
have continued to remain below the cross-country trend line, though at a much reduced
distance compared to previous years. 3
The preceding observation, however, should not detract from the
remarkable increase in schooling that occurred during the 1980s. While average
schooling level in Mexico increased by roughly one year per decade during 1960-1980
(from 2.76 to 4.77 years), it increased by two years in the decade between 1980-1990. As
described in Psacharopoulos et al (1996), this rapid improvement reflects the great efforts
made in Mexico to increase both the quality of and access to public education since 1950.
A consequence of these developments is that the share of workers with less than primary
education decreased from almost half of the labor force in 1984  to 36 percent in 1994,
while the share of workers with at least a completed secondary education increased from
26 to 39 percent; Table 1.
The rapid growth of education attainment in Mexico also stands out in
recent cross-country growth studies (e.g., Bosworth, 1997), which decompose per capita
growth into the contributions from several factors, including education attainment as a
proxy for human capital accumulation, in a growth accounting framework. These studies
reveal a major break in Mexico's growth performance after 1982. A similar break is
visible in the accumulation of physical capital and in total factor productivity growth, but
not in the accumulation of schooling, which performed well by world standards.
3 Mexico's education deficit -- i.e., the vertical difference from the world trend line in Figure 1 --  has
declined significantly since 1960, with the main catch-up occurring in 1980-90. This is clearly visible
from Figure 1, but also appears under less restrictive specifications of the estimated trend line. The
differences from the trendline are stated below, beginning with the most restrictive specification:
Equation Specification  1960  1970  1980  1985  1990  Std. Error of
(difference from world mean in years)  Regression
Stacked, without dummies  -2.22  -2.09  -1.95  -1.36  +0.08  1.52
Stacked with dummy variables  -1.62  -1.49  -1.82  -1.54  -0.26  1.48
Individual equations for each year  -1.55  -1.41  -1.84  -1.59  -0.26  na5
B.  Changes in Earnings Inequality
At the same time as this remarkable advance in education attainment was
taking place, the distribution of income in Mexico worsened notably; see e.g., De la Torre
(1997), Panuco-Laguette and Szekely (1996). For example, the Gini coefficient of
Mexico's total income distribution increased from 0.43 in 1984 to 0.48 in 1994. This
deterioration  took place before the 1995 recession and, thus, cannot be attributed to
business cycle effects. Instead, the increase in overall income inequality appears to be
closely related to an increase in the dispersion of wages and salaries across different
schooling levels. Table 1 describes the change in real wages between 1984 and 1994,
using two concepts of remuneration (described in Section D.)
Table 1: Real Wage Rates in Mexico
(Unless  stated  otherwise,  all figures  refer  to hourly  rates  expressed  in constant  1994  Pesos)
Wages & Salaries  Monetary Income  Share  of Workers
Schooling Level  1984  1994  difference 1984  1994  difference  1984  1994
0 -less than primary  3.17  3.08  -2.8%  4.83  4.12  -14.7%  48.1%  35.7%
1 - primary complete  5.23  4.42  -15.5%  7.90  5.39  -31.8%  26.3%  25.4%
2 - secondary complete  6.55  5.83  -11.0%  7.55  6.90  -8.6%  13.3%  21.3%
3 - preparatory complete  9.62  11.68  21.4%  10.64  12.84  20.7%  7.8%  11.1%
4 - university and above  14.93  21.96  47.1%  16.94  25.55  50.8%  4.5%  6.6%
weighted  average  5.62  6.88  22.4%  7.00  7.57  8.1%
Source:  Own  calculations  based  on  ENIGH84  and  ENIGH94.  All  figures  are  weighted  averages  using
expansion  factors  to reflect  national  representation.
Even though the average wage increased during the decade spanned by
Table 1, most workers experienced a significant decline in their wages. This disparity in
the evolution of real wages is most visible in Figure 2, which shows that 83 percent of the
working population experienced a decline in real wages during the last decade.
Figure 2
MEXICO
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The deterioration  of real wages was partly compensated  for through
increases  in hours  worked,  suggesting  backward  bending labor  supply curves  at low
income  levels.  This was not enough, however,  to prevent  an erosion  of overall  income
for the majority  of workers;  Table  2.
Table 2:  Average Hours  Worked and Income Received
Schooling Level  Wage Earners  Monetary Income
Recipients
Avg. Hours per Week  1984  1994  change  1984  1994  change
0 - less than primary  44.8  50.7  13.3%  43.0  46.8  8.8%
1 - primary complete  45.1  49.0  8.6%  44.7  48.2  7.9%
2 - secondary complete  44.4  46.8  5.6%  44.5  46.8  5.2%
3 - preparatory complete  38.7  43.7  12.8%  38.9  44.1  13.4%
4 - university and above  41.6  44.7  7.5%  42.2  44.7  5.9%
weighted  average  44.1  47.8  8.5%  43.3  46.7  7.8%
Avg. Annual  Income  1984  1994  change  1984  1994  change
(in 1994  Pesos)
0 - less  than  primary  7,530  7,674  1.9%  9,514  8,308  -12.7%
1  - primary  complete  12,705 11,316  -10.9%  15,888 13,222  -16.8%
2 - secondary  complete  15,343 14,097  -8.1%  16,995 15,978  -6.0%
3 - preparatory  complete  18,643 25,709  37.9%  19,483 27,898  43.2%
4 - university  and  above  33,899 55,428  63.5%  38,741 62,769  62.0%
weighted  average  13,057  16,658  27.6%  14,268  16,931  18.7%
Source:  Own  calculations  based  on ENIGH84  and ENIGH94.  All figures  are weighted
averages  using  expansion  factors  to achieve  representation  at the national  level.
One explanation  for a deteriorating  income distribution  that is closely
connected  to the advance  in education  attainment  has been made by Ram  (1  990).
Education  is generally  considered  to have an equalizing  effect on incomes, which  would
indicate  a positive  relation  between  measures  of income inequality  and of education
inequality.  However,  the dispersion  of schooling  attainment  and the mean level of
schooling  need not be positively  related  in a monotonic  manner.  Upon exploring this
relationship  by way of a cross-country  analysis, Ram finds  a curvilinear  (Kuznets-type
inverted-U)  relation  between  the mean  level of schooling  and schooling  inequality  in the
labor force.4 That is, as schooling  expands,  education  inequality  first increases,  but then
starts declining  after reaching  a peak.  That  turning  point  occurs when mean schooling  is
4The  theoretical  rationale  underlying  this fmding  is reminiscent  of the "Laffer  curve"  in  public  finance
theory.  It stated  that  tax revenues  are 0 when  tax rates are 0 and will  again  become  0 when  the tax rate
approaches  100%  (as that  would  eliminate  all incentive  to work.) Since  revenues  are positive  at tax
rates between  0% and 100%,  the revenue-rate  relationship  must  broadly  approximate  an inverted-U.
In the case  of education,  the "theory"  states  that  when  no one in  society  is educated,  the distribution
of education  is perfectly  equal,  as it would  be when  everyone  in society  has  a Ph.D.  (considered  for
simplicity  to be the maximal  level of education  attainment).  In the process  of going  from a Zero-
education  society  to the Land  of Ph.D.s,  the distribution  of education  must  perforce  become  more
unequal  before it ultimately  improves  again.7
about 6.8 years for the full sample of countries, and 6.3 years for the sub-sample of less
developed countries. So, if Mexican schooling levels had been below the turning point, it
is conceivable that the rapid increase of education attainment in the 1980s may have
contributed to greater earnings inequality via an increased inequality of schooling
attainment.
The evidence does not support this explanation for the increased earnings
inequality in Mexico: using Ram's (1990) method of calculation based on 5 schooling
levels, the mean level of schooling in Mexico was 6.45 years in 1984 and 7.65 years in
1994. This means that Mexico started in 1984 with a mean level of schooling that was
slightly above the "turning point" according to the LDC subsample and slightly below the
turning point for the full sample of countries, while it ended up in 1994 with a mean
schooling level substantially above the turning point.  If the curvilinear relation is evenly
distributed around the turning point, we should clearly expect the inequality of schooling
in Mexico to have declined over that decade.
This conclusion is confirmed by decomposing the change of the Gini
Index between 1984 and 1994 into the proportion  that is attributable to changes in the
wage rate, in hours worked and in education attainment. Table 3 presents the results of
such an exercise, both for the distribution of Wage and Salary incomes, as well as the
broader Monetary income concept. For each income concept, several "synthetic" Gini
indexes are calculated: 5 the first two, Gini-1984 and Gini-1994, are based on the
distribution of wage rates, hours worked and education attainment that pertain in each
year. The next three indexes are derived by recalculating the 1984 Gini index after
successively replacing the 1984 distribution of wage rates, hours worked and schooling
attainment by its 1994 counterpart.  The second column under each income concept
reports the value of each Gini index calculated in this manner, while the third column
reports the percentage difference of these values relative to the original 1984 Gini index.
Table 3:  Sources of Increased  Earnings  Inequality
Wages & Salaries  Monetary Income
Level  %change  over  Level  %change  over
Gini-84  Gini-84
Gini 1984  0.2281  0.0  Gini  1984  0.1712  0.0
Gini 1994  0.3034  33.0  Gini  1994  0.2812  64.3
Gini-Awage  0.2962  29.9  Gini-Awage  0.2543  48.5
Gini-Ahours  0.2208  -3.2  Gini-Ahours  0.1696  -0.9
Gini-Aeducation 0.2222  -2.6  Gini-Aeducation 0.1710  -0.1
Source:  Own  calculations  based  on data  from Tables  I and 2.
Note: the %-changes  in  the lower  half of each  column  do not add up to the %-difference
between  Gini-94  and Gini-84  due  to large  rounding  errors.
Table 3 indicates that the "synthetic" Gini index increased by 33 percent
between 1984 and 1994 (under the Wage and Salary income concept) and that over 90
5 These  "synthetic"  Gini  indexes  are constructed  under  the assumption  that all the individuals  with  a given
schooling  level  earn  the same  wage  rate  and work  the same  number  of hours  as the averages  shown
for each schooling  level in  Table  2.8
percent (29.9 . 33.0) of that increase in earnings inequality is attributable  to the change in
the distribution of wage rates over that decade.  (Using the broader Monetary income
concept, around 75 percent of the increase in earnings inequality is explained  by the
change in wage rates.) On the other hand, changes in the distribution of education
attainment are shown in both cases to have contributed to a reduction in earnings
inequality, though by modest amounts; -2.6 and -0.1 percent. Changes in hours worked
also contributed modestly toward reducing income inequality.  In light of this evidence,
we can safely rule out increased schooling inequality as an explanation of the increased
income inequality that took place in Mexico over the last decade.
Three broad hypotheses that do not hinge on changes in the distribution of
education attainment are frequently advanced to explain the similar increases in earnings
inequality experienced in Mexico and other countries. 6 These link the increase of
earnings inequality to (i) the increased openness of the economy, (ii) institutional changes
in the labor market, and (iii) skill-biased technological change. The first of these
hypotheses argues that as trade barriers are reduced, an economy is placed under
increased competitive pressures to specialize along its lines of comparative advantage.  A
developed country that is relatively high skill-abundant, like the United States, will be
induced to specialize in high skill- or education-intensive activities as its low-skill
industries come under increased competitive pressure from low skill-abundant,  low-wage
countries.
This explanation has several problems when applied to the United States,
and becomes even less persuasive when applied to Mexico. Mexico greatly liberalized its
trade regime since 1984. However, the reduction of its trade barriers has mostly been vis-
a-vis imports from the developed countries, notably the United States and Canada, whose
share in total Mexican merchandise imports increased from 68 percent in 1985 to 73
percent in 1993 (and to 77.5 percent in 1996). Since Mexico is a low skill-abundant
country compared to its two northern neighbors, it would be expected that the
liberalization of trade Would  have induced a specialization pattern that would raise the
relative demand (and hence wages) for the lesser educated members of the labor force.
This did not happen. Instead, the increase in earnings inequality observed in Mexico is
identical to that observed in the United States: less educated workers experienced real
wage declines, while highly educated workers experienced real wage improvements.  7
6 See,  for example,  the Symposium  on Wage  Inequality  published  in  Journal  of Economic  Perspectives
(1997)  and the Symposium  on "How  International  Exchange,  Technology  and Institutions  Affect
Workers"  published  in The  World  Bank  Economic  Review  (1997).
7 The trade-based  explanation  may  still  be relevant  to the extent  that  greater  openness  facilitates  the transfer
of ideas  and  technology,  which  is identified  below  as the more  persuasive  explanation  of the increase
in earnings  inequality.  A variant  on the globalization/technology  nexus  explanation,  advanced  by
Feenstra  and Hanson  (1994),  involves  outsourcing  behavior  where  multinational  enterprises  in the
developed  country  relocate  their lower  skill-intensive  activities  to the less  skill-abundant  developed
countries.  However,  what is a low  skill  activity  in  the United  States  may  be a high-skill  activity  in
Mexico,  which  could  explain  the identical  evolution  of earnings  inequality  in both  countries.9
The second explanation revolves around institutional changes such as
reductions in the minimum wage, the decreasing strength of trade unions and the
declining share of state-owned enterprises. The existence of a binding minimum wage,
for example, truncates the lower end of the wage distribution. As the minimum wage is
allowed to erode away, say through inflation, it becomes less binding by moving further
down the low end of the wage distribution, with the result that, ceteris paribus, a higher
share of wages will lie below the previous minimum wage level. That translates into an
increased dispersion in wages and earnings.  Similarly, strong trade unions have often
been found to exert an egalitarian effect on the wage distribution, while at the same time
commanding a wage premium for union members. Any waning of union strength, as
happened in the United States over the last two decades, therefore would contribute to an
increase in wage dispersion. A review of institutional developments  in the Mexican labor
market by Hemrndez et al (1998) showed that these factors may have contributed to a
higher wage dispersion. Most important in this regard was the apparent decline in union
strength, in part due to the privatization of public enterprises during the early 1990s. That
review also showed that the real decline of minimum wages since the early 1980s may
have had an impact as well, but mainly confined to wages in the primary sector.
Perhaps the most persuasive explanation, both for the United States and
Mexico, is that which links earnings inequality to skill-biased technological changes that
raise the relative demand for higher-skilled labor. According  to the typology used by
Johnson (1997), the type of technological change that drives up the wages of more highly
skilled workers and drives down those of less skilled workers -- as occurred in both the
United States and Mexico -- is extensive skill-biased technological  change. Under this
type of technological change, skilled workers become more efficient in jobs that were
traditionally performed by unskilled workers. A demand/supply  analysis in Hernandez et
al (1998) provides support for this explanation in the case of Mexico: it showed that
secular changes in demand for workers differentiated  by education level were the
dominant force behind recent adjustments in the Mexican labor market, with the market
for more educated workers dominated by intra-sectoral increases in demand, and for less
educated workers by intra-sectoral decreases in demand, independent  of gender and
experience. That outcome suggests that the rise in wage dispersion originates from
changes in the intra-sectoral production structure, which favors educated versus
uneducated workers, rather than from changing trade patterns, which would affect the
demand for labor differently across sectors.8
C.  Some Background Facts  on Education Spending
Mexico's overall spending on education, as a share of GDP, is slightly
above the OECD average and compares favorably with education spending levels in other
developing countries. Total spending per student in Mexico increased steeply in the
second half of the 1980s and early 1990s, even though the total student population
increased, from 24 million in 1985 to 27 mnillion  in 1995.  Part of this increase reflects a
sThese findings  correlate  with  earlier  findings  for Mexico  (Cragg  and  Epelbaum,  1994)  as well  as for
Chile,  following  its trade  liberalization  program  (Robbins,  1994).10
rebound from the expenditure cuts that were made in response to the debt crisis in 1982.
By 1994, however, total spending on education had risen to 5.4 percent of GDP, or
almost a full percentage point above its previous peak of 4.5 percent reached in 1982.
Figure 3
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Source: Informe  de Gobiemo,  1989  and 1997.
Figure 3 describes the evolution of funding for education in Mexico since
the early 1980s. Private spending represenited  less than 10 percent of total expenditures
in education in 1987, and has fallen to below 5 percent in recent years. (This figure
somewhat underestimates total private costs, which, with some adjustments noted in the
Annex could be around 27% of total education spending.) Similarly, the share of state
and municipal spending peaked at 17% of total spending in 1990, but since then also
declined to less than 10 percent of total spending. The federal government, on the other
hand, currently accounts for 87 percent of total sector spending. These figures are not far
out of line with those from an OECD review of education expenditures, which indicated
that in 1994, about 19 percent of spending on education in Mexico came from private
sources, compared to a country average of 13 percent for the whole of the OECD. 9
Mexico does not stand out particularly in the preceding comparison. As in
most countries, the public sector directly or indirectly finances the lion's share of
education expenditures. Mexico does stand out in contrast to its OECD partners,
however, when these expenditures are disaggregated  by level of instruction. As shown in
OECD (1998, pg. 97) the ratio of spending per student at the tertiary level compared to
spending at the primary level exceeded 500 percent in 1994 and was the highest among
OECD countries. (The ratio in Korea, for example, is close to the OECD average of 264
percent, or less than half the Mexican ratio.)
9These  figures  comprise  total  expenditures  on education,  including  privately  purchased  materials,  whereas
the earlier  figures  shown  in Table  3 are identical  to the what  the OECD  expenditure  review  refers  to
as direct  spending  on educational  institutions.11
Table 4:  Federal Education Spending per Student by Level
Federal Spending per Student
(constant 1994 Pesos)  (as share spent on  Primary)
primary secondary preparatory university  prim.  second. prep.  univ.
1980  1166.1  2571.8  4823.7  8667.3  1  2.2  4.1  7.4
1981  1447.6  2790.6  6156.9  11544.0  1  1.9  4.3  8.0
1982  935.8  2027.3  4586.4  10061.0  1  2.2  4.9  10.8
1983  710.5  1562.0  2714.7  6451.4  1  2.2  3.8  9.1
1984  691.1  1644.3  3108.4  6544.2  1  2.4  4.5  9.5
1985  715.0  1473.3  3582.2  7174.8  1  2.1  5.0  10.0
1986  961.5  2094.6  3329.3  11686.2  '  2.2  3.5  12.2
1987  683.7  1308.3  3364.0  6334.3  1  1.9  4.9  9.3
1988  665.1  1303.0  3423.0  6520.2  1  2.0  5.1  9.8
1989  734.0  1438.9  3756.0  6176.3  1  2.0  5.1  8.4
1990  808.4  1685.8  3502.8  6473.5  1  2.1  4.3  8.0
1991  1011.4  1942.6  3772.9  6898.3  1  1.9  3.7  6.8
1992  1285.9  2318.7  3384.3  9313.2  1  1.8  2.6  7.2
1993  1584.6  2568.4  4304.6  11637.2  1  1.6  2.7  7.3
1994  1731.3  3139.4  5215.1  13253.0  1  1.8  3.1  7.7
1995  1679.0  2511.0  4508.1  11202.3  1  1.5  2.7  6.7
1996  1647.7  2464.2  4442.9  11328.5  1  1.5  2.7  6.9
1997  1811.9  2709.7  4882.1  12692.2  1  1.5  2.7  7.0
Source: Presidencia de la Republica, Primer Informe de Gobiemo, 1989,  and Tercer
Informe de Gobiemo, 1997.
The great disparity in per-student spending at different education levels in
Mexico is also reflected in Table 4, which only refers to federal expenditures. This Table
also shows, however, that the evolution of public spending on education in Mexico has
become more egalitarian  across different schooling categories over time. In the early
1980s,  the amount of federal spending per university student averaged 10 times the
amount spent per primary student. This ratio fell to around 7 times in the early 1  990s.
Federal spending on the other levels relative to the primary level indicate a similar
decline, even though the absolute amounts increased at all levels. In other words, even
though the recent pattern of spending on education in Mexico exhibited a highly uneven
bias in favor of tertiary education relative to other categories, the pattern of spending in
earlier periods exhibited and even greater bias.
D. The Rates of Return on Investments in Education
One way to assess the economic merits of the preceding spending patterns,
considered as investments in education, is by comparing their relative rates of return. This
section compares the rates of return to education as derived from several human capital
earnings functions. These were estimated with data from two income-expenditure
surveys (ENIGH) carried out by the National Statistical Institute (INEGI) in the third
quarters of 1984 and 1994. These two survey years provide an excellent setting for
comparisons: first, both years can be considered macroeconomically  comparable in that
the economy is neither in recession nor booming. Secondly, both years are almost equi-
distant in time from the major stabilization and structural reform measures implemented12
by the Mexican Government in the latter half of the 1980s. They are especially suitable,
therefore, for making 'before and after' comparisons.
The ENIGH surveys identify the educational attainment, income received
and number of hours worked per week by each family member.' 0 Income is differentiated
into about 25 items, which were aggregated into three broad categories: (i) wage and
salary income, (ii) current monetary income, which includes wages and salaries, income
from self-employment, property income and rents, monetary transfers and income from
financial assets, and (iii) total current income, which includes all of the above items, plus
non-monetized income such as imputed rent, in-kind transfers and stock dividends. In
contrast to this disaggregation of income sources, the ENIGH surveys do not differentiate
the number of hours worked per week by activity. The rates of return calculated below
are based on two measures of earnings per hour: the wage rate, which refers to wage and
salary earnings per week, divided by the total number of hours worked per week, and the
monetary earnings rate, which refers to current monetary income divided by the same
number of hours worked per week.
Tables 5 and 6 present the private and the public rates of return on
investments in education in Mexico. The method used to estimate these rates of return is
explained in detail in the Annex.  The distinction between public and private rates of
return in this context centers around who bears the cost of financing the investment in
education: in both cases, the benefits of an additional year of schooling are reflected in
the stream of additional earnings that accrue to an individual as a result of that additional
education. The rate of return to education is then the discount rate that equates the
present value of this stream of additional earnings  to the present value of the costs
incurred. When only private costs are considered in this calculation, it is tenned the
private rate of return, and when all public and private costs are considered, it is termed
the social rate of retum.
Table 5:  Private Rates of Return to Schooling in Mexico
(Private  cost  of education  is 100%  of foregone  full year's earnings;  KP  = 1.)
Wage Earners  Monetary Income Recipients
1984  1994  1984  1994
Average  "Mincerian"  15.2%  16.7%  14.6%  17.2%
by schooling level
1 - primary complete  16.9%  13.8%  14.7%  14.3%
2 - secondary complete  13.9%  16.7%  14.5%  16.0%
3 - preparatory complete  15.5%  18.2%  14.4%  19.2%
4 - university and above  10.3%  19.9%  12.8%  20.6%
Source: Tables  Aland A2,  using  the method  described  in the Annex.
°Several  sources  of potential  bias in the data base  require  attention:  first,  casual  evidence  indicates  that  the
sample  of families  included  in the ENIGH  surveys  is truncated  in  that  the very  rich and the very  poor
appear  to be underrepresented.  Indigenous  groups,  which  are estimated  at around  1o percent of
Mexico's  population,  also  appear  underrepresented.  Finally,  there  appear  to have  been some
sampling  problems  involving  the 1984  survey  (the  first  year  the  survey  was  conducted  by INEGI),
which  may  have  affected  its comparability  with  the 1994  survey.13
Two phenomena about the private rates of return draw attention in Table
5: the first is that the overall rate of return to education has increased between 1984 and
1994, as seen from the "Mincerian" rates of return. This is a direct consequence of the
increased dispersion in wages that took place over that period.  Secondly, the rates of
return for different levels of schooling have changed in ranking.  In 1984, the lower levels
of education uniformly yielded greater rates of return than investments in higher levels of
education. This ranking is completely reversed in 1994, with the private rates of return to
primary education declining significantly below the rates of return to higher education,
which almost doubled." 1
Table 6: Social Rates of Return  to Schooling in Mexico
Wage  Earners  Monetary  Income  Recipients
Schooling  Level  1984  1994  1984  1994
l-priinarycomplete  15.5%  11.3%  13.7%  11.8%
2 - secondary  complete  12.4%  13.0%  13.1%  12.7%
3 - preparatory  complete  12.9%  13.2%  12.2%  14.4%
44-university  and above  7.6%  13.2%  9.6%  13.9%
Source:  Tables  Aland  A2,  using  the  method  described  in the  Annex.
As in the case of the private rates of return, the social rates in Table 6 also
indicate a decline in the rate of return for primary education and increases in the rates of
returns for higher education during the decade between 1984 and 1994. A noteworthy
difference to the private rates of return, however, is that the social rates of return exhibit a
much lower dispersion across schooling levels in 1994 than in 1984. That is, the social
rates of return associated with different investments are much closer together, which, in a
standard capital market context, suggests a decline in market segmentation and, thus, a
more efficient allocation of investment resources in education.
E.  A Policy Dilemma
A general efficiency criterion for investing is that resources should be first
invested in those activities that yield the highest rate of return until the point where the
marginal rate of return drops to the level of the activity with the next highest rate of
return. Barring any corner solutions and assuming that investments in education exhibit
decreasing marginal rates of return, this rule will have the effect of equating rates of
return across different activities.  Suppose that the government were following this
efficiency rule in its allocation of public resources in education in the face of increased
wage dispersion. As shown in the Annex, that would mean that the pattern of public
spending in education would have to adjust in the same direction as the private rates of
" Theprivate  rates  of return  in Table  5 pertaining  to 1984  are  very  similar  to the  private  rates  reported  for
Mexico  in  Psacharopoulos  (1994a).  The  main  difference  arises  with  regard  to primary  education,
where  his  paper  reports  a significantly  higher  return.  The  reason  is because  Psacharopoulos  assumes
that  the  foregone  earnings  from  attending  primary  school  are  roughly  half  the  figure  used  in our
calculations,  which  are  based  on Annex  Table  A3. Psacharopoulos'  lower  assumption  is meant  to
adjust  for  the  very  low  opportunity  cost  of  young  children  attending  primary  school.14
return to education. In other words, as the dispersion of wages increases, the private rates
of return on investments in higher education increase. Other things equal, that also raises
the social rates of return for higher education levels in the same proportion. Therefore, to
prevent a misalignment of the social rates of return in education, the government would
have to shift resources away from primary education (which raises its rate of return) and
toward higher education (thereby causing a compensating reduction in its marginal rate of
return).
The preceding response, based on efficiency considerations, would
conflict with equity considerations in the short run, though not necessarily in terms of
long term consequences. Insofar as the primary level encompasses a higher proportion of
individuals from poor households than do higher education levels, the efficient response
would change the pattern of direct spending toward more affluent individuals. Moreover,
that change in spending would come about after the already existing income disparities
across households had been aggravated by the movement in relative wages. Over time,
the increased spending on higher education leads to a higher relative supply of more
educated workers, which depresses their relative wage and, thereby, has an equalizing
effect on total earnings. That equalizing consequence occurs in the long run, however,
and would have little impact on the earnings of the currently affected generation of
workers.
A surprising thing about Mexico over the last decade is that even though
public spending has become more evenly distributed, the social rates of return in Table 6
also have become more uniform in 1994 compared to 1984. The answer to this puzzle
lies in the very distorted pattern of education spending that existed at the beginning of the
period.  Public education spending in the early 1980s was very skewed toward higher
education, which exhibited the lowest rates of return. That is, it was both inefficient and
inequitable.' 2 By moving toward a more even distribution of per capita spending across
different levels, equity was improved. At the same time, the external environment
changed in a manner that raised the relative return to higher education, thereby tending to
make more efficient what had initially been an inefficient allocation of resources.
As the social rates of return to education become equalized, however, the
opportunities for achieving gains by undoing past mistakes will be exhausted. That
means that policymakers will no longer be able to evade this equity-efficiency tradeoff,
assuming that the rate of  skill-biased technological change continues as before. So long
as education spending remains concentrated at the federal government level, that same
government will have to decide whether to respond to exogenous increases in the rates of
return to higher education by shifting more resources toward higher education at the
expense of increased inequity in spending, or by maintaining a more equitable spending
distribution at the expense of increased inefficiency.
12 This  observation  is consistent  with  earlier  findings  by Elias  (1992),  which  indicated  that  growth  in  the
"quality"  of  the  labor  force  contributed  little  to Mexico's  overall  economic  growth  in the 1960s  and
1970s,  compared  with  other  Latin  American  countries.15
There is no easy response to this dilemma.  The politically least
controversial response of assigning more resources to higher education through a higher
overall budget to education runs into fiscal constraints." 3 Barring more public resources,
the only option for expanding of investment in higher education (desired on efficiency
grounds) without cutting public funding for primary education is by attracting greater
private sector participation.
To facilitate greater private participation, it is useful to distinguish more
clearly the roles of the private and public sectors. The classic assignment of
responsibilities limits the public sector's involvement to the provision of public goods, as
well as correction for market failures and externalities. In that context, it is often argued
that the positive externalities from education are highest at the primary level and
progressively decline at the higher levels; Schultz (1988). That is, at higher education
levels, the individuals receiving the education capture a progressively larger share of the
total social benefits yielded from the education in the form of higher wages.  That being
the case, there is less of a risk that private individuals left to their own devices would
underinvest from a social viewpoint in higher education than that they would underinvest
in primary education. The externalities from different levels of education are difficult to
measure and compare empirically.  However, if the rationale for state intervention in the
provision of higher education services is based on the argument that rates of return were
too low to induce the right amount of  investment from the private sector, that rationale
has certainly become less compelling with the significant increases in private rates of
return observed in recent years.
The options for greater private sector participation in higher education are
many. They range from greater participation in the funding of education services to
greater participation in the direct provision of services. 14 At the very least, the rise in
private rates of return for higher education makes a compelling case for increasing the
level of cost-recovery in higher education, independently of whether it is the State or the
private sector that provides those services. The lack of long-term financing for private
investments in higher education represents an important obstacle to the implementation of
this solution. That obstacle is rooted in a systemic market failure (due, among other, to
bans on indentured servitude) that poses problems in most countries, but is especially
pronounced in Mexico on account of its very weak financial system. The proper role of
government is precisely to correct or compensate for such market failures. A promising
way to correct these market failures in Mexico is through student loan programs, or
means-tested financial aid and scholarship programs. These programs are currently
almost non-existent in Mexico, as the public sector has relied mainly on the direct, cost-
free provision of higher education services. The scholarship programs suggested here as
an alternative promise to yield a more efficient resource allocation than a cost-free
3  A sense  of  the  potential  magnitude  of  these  fiscal  costs  can  be obtained  from  OECD  (1997,  Chart  B 1.3).
It  estimates  that  raising  Mexico's  enrollment  ratios  in tertiary  education  to the  OECD  average  level,
would  involve  an increase  of expenditures  on  educational  institutions  by 1.4  percent  of GDP.  This  is
almost  twice  the size  of the fiscal  revenue  shock  (estimated  at 0.8  percent  of GDP)  caused  by the
decline  of oil prices  in late  1997  and  early  1998.
14 See OECD  (1997,  pg. 54) for  a list  of various  options  for  the  funding  of tertiary  institutions.16
provision of services. Although such programs have rarely been devoid of subsidy
components wherever they have been implemented worldwide, that subsidy is more
closely targeted to the source of the market failure." 5
Looking toward the future, there are two developments  that bode well for
the distribution of income in Mexico in future years.  One is that Mexico has gotten past
"Ram's turning point" (section B), so that further advances in the average schooling level
should result in a more even distribution of education across the labor force. Other things
being equal, that should translate into a more equal distribution of earnings. The other
development is that the supply of workers with higher education is increasing, which is
the desired market response to the increased wage premium on higher education. The
increasing supply of more educated workers should eventually reduce the wage premium
received by such workers and, thus, also tend to equalize the earnings distribution.  In
view of the long gestation periods associated with investments in education, however, the
income-equalizing dynamics in both cases operate with a long-term horizon. Any
reallocations in education expenditures, therefore, should be made with that horizon in
mind and not be seen as substitutes for income transfers designed to compensate for
current income inequalities.
F.  Summary
This chapter arrived at six principal conclusions and one recommendation:
*  The accumulation of human capital, as proxied by education attainment, does not
appear to be among the factors responsible for Mexico's disappointing growth
performance since the early 1980s, but rather stands out positively in historical and
international comparisons.
*  Mexico experienced a pronounced increase in earnings inequality during the period
1984-94, in spite of a rapid expansion of education attainment levels that exerted an
equalizing impact on earnings. Of the various hypotheses that have been advanced to
explain the increased earnings inequality in Mexico as well as other developing and
developed countries, the most persuasive appears to be that it is caused by an
increased rate of skill-biased technological change, whose transmission to developing
countries may have been facilitated by the increased openness of those economies.
The  preceding  analysis  contains  an  interesting  parallel  to Beristain's  (1991)  analysis  of options  to meet
the rapidly  increasing  demand  for higher  education  foreseen  in Mexico  for  the 1990s. In his analysis,
the demand  for higher  education  emerges  from  exogenous  demographic  pressures.  In this paper,  the
increased  demand  results  from exogenous  increases  in  the dispersion  of wages  observed  in Mexico
and other  countries.  Among  the response  options  outlined  by Beristain,  the first  is to maintain  the
status  quo, which  mainly  involves  the provision  of services  by public  universities  on a cost-free  basis.
The second  option  is to charge  an increasing  share  of education  costs  to beneficiaries,  while  keeping
the provision  of service  in public  hands. The third  option  goes  one step  further  by transferring  an
increasing  portion  of the provision  of services  to private  hands. He concludes  that  Mexico's  fiscal
constraints  and political  considerations  render  the first  option  non-viable,  so that  increased  demand
for university  education  is best  accomodated  through  a response  that  involves  a combination  of the
second  and  third option. The conclusions  of this  paper also  point  in  the same  direction.17
*  The increased earnings inequality is associated closely with a higher dispersion of the
average wages received by workers with different schooling attainment. This had the
consequence, in turn, of  raising the private rates of return to higher levels of
education; in effect reversing the traditional pattern of rates of return, where the
highest rates are reported for the primary level. The social rates of return also exhibit
this reversal in the relative magnitude of the rates of return. In contrast to the
increased dispersion of the private rates, however, the social rates of return across
different schooling levels have become more uniform in 1994, compared with 1984.
This suggests that the assignment of education resources has become more efficient.
*  Government spending on education rose significantly in the early 1990s. It also
became more equitably distributed as per-student spending in higher education
declined markedly compared to per-student spending at the primary level.  Spending
on education continues to be very concentrated in the public sector, especially at the
federal level.
- That a more equitable distribution of public spending on education was achieved
simultaneously with a more efficient spending pattern -- as reflected in the reduced
dispersion of social rates of return -- is very surprising. Normally one expects a
tradeoff between equity and efficiency in this context. What explains this result is
that the spending pattern in the early 1980s was both highly inefficient and
inequitable.  So reduced spending at higher levels made for a more equitable
distribution of resources, while simultaneous changes in the external environment that
raised the returns on higher schooling levels, caused the allocation of resources
(which continues to be biased toward higher education) to become more efficient.
- As the social rates of return are equalized, the possibilities of exploiting initial
inequities and inefficiencies will become exhausted. Furthermore, there is little
reason to expect the pace of technological change to abate, so that wage dispersion
may well continue to increase.  This will continue to raise the rates of return for
higher education, warranting the shift of more resources toward higher education on
the basis of efficiency considerations, which ultimately translate into productivity
considerations. To the extent that resource shifts in that direction are thwarted by
equity considerations, output and productivity growth will suffer.
The recommended solution to the preceding dilemma is for the government to
progressively pass on a greater share of the costs of higher education to its direct
beneficiaries, while facilitating the private absorption of those costs through student
loan programs designed to correct market failures in the financial sector.18
Annex
Technical Note on Measuring the Rates of Return in Education
The rates of return on investmnents  in education presented earlier are
derived according to a method outlined by Chiswick (1997). It assumes that the annual
earnings of a worker with schooling level s, denoted EB,  are identically equal to the annual
earnings that he would have received with a year less of schooling, plus the cost of
investing in one extra year of schooling, C 5, multiplied times the rate of return on that
investment, r8, or,
Es =Es 5 +  r8C,  =E.,(  1 +  r,C /E.,)  =E.- 1 (+  r K+  )
=Eo  BI  (1 +  rt  K),
t-I
where K, represents the cost of investing in schooling level t relative to a full year's
potential earnings if investments were not made in that level of schooling. Taking the
natural logarithm of both sides of this equation, the relation between earnings and
schooling can then be stated as:
A.1)  Ln(E,)  =  Ln(E. )  +  Z 5 Ln(l + rK).
The assumptions that r, and K, do not vary with years of schooling, together with the
approximation rule for logarithms, give rise to the following "Mincerian" specification
of the earnings function that can be estimated:
A.2)  Ln(E5)  =  Ln(E0)  +  (rK)S.
The estimated equations based on this "Mincerian" specification, including a separate
variable representing years of labor market experience, are shown in Table Al.  16  The
corresponding rates of return derived from these estimated coefficients were presented in
Table 5 under the assumption that K is equal to 1. Also, since the rate of return is
assumed to be the same for all levels of schooling in this case, the marginal rate of return
from an additional year of schooling is the same as the average return.
1 6The  inclusion  of  labor  market  experience,  using  a quadratic  specification,  has  become  a  standard
procedure  in  the  estimation  of human  capital  earnings  function  ever  since  Jacob  Mincer  showed  in
1974  that  its  exclusion  yields  biased  estimates  of  the  schooling  variable  coefficients.19
Table Al:  Estimated Mincerian Earnings Functions
Dependent  variable  = Ln(hourly  income)
Wage Earners  Monetary Income Recipients
Independent  1984  1994  1984  1994
Variables
coeff  std.error  coeff  std.error  coeff  std.  coeff  std.error
Constant  -0.437  0.042  -0.676  0.026  Error  -0.233  0.027
Experience  0.070  0.003  0.062  0.002  -0.307  0.041  0.060  0.001
ExperienceA2  -0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.065  0.002  -0.001  0.000
Schooling  0.152  0.003  0.167  0.002  -0.001  0.000  0.172  0.002
0.146  0.003
R-square  0.35  0.38  0.27  0.33
Adj R-sq.  0.35  0.38  0.27  0.33
No. observ.  4,864  12,991  7,555  22,269
Source: Estimated with data from ENIGH84 and ENIGH94
The "extended" version of the earnings function is derived by assuming
that rt  and Kt  vary across the four education categories stated in Table A2:
*  Category 1 refers to having completed the primary education level (which comprises
6 years) and may include some attendance at the secondary level,
*  Category 2 refers to having completed the secondary  level (comprising an additional
3 years), and may include some attendance at the preparatory level,
*  Category 3 refers to having completed the preparatory level (3 years), and may
include some university attendance, and
*  Category  refers to having completed the university level (4 years) and any
additional post-graduate education.
Table A2:  Estimated Extended  Earnings Functions
(Dependent variable = Ln(hourly income)
Wage Earners  Monetary Income Recipients
Independent variables  1984  1994  1984  1994
coeff  std.error  coeff  std. error  coeff  std.error  coeff  std.error
Constant  -0.108  0.040  -0.214  0.026  0.038  0.039  -0.233  0.027
Experience  0.070  0.003  0.062  0.002  0.065  0.002  0.060  0.002
Experience^2  -0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.000
Dummy Variables
Primary complete  0.674  0.030  0.553  0.021  0.586  0.028  0.606  0.021
Secondary complete  1.088  0.036  1.043  0.023  1.016  0.036  1.104  0.024
Preparatory complete  1.644  0.046  1.704  0.027  1.546  0.047  1.779  0.030
University complete  1.979  0.057  2.362  0.032  1.946  0.057  2.453  0.035
R-square  0.34  0.37  0.26  0.32
Adj. R-sq.  0.34  0.37  0.26  0.32
No. Observations  4864  13,991  7,555  22,269
Source: Estimated with data from ENIGH84 and ENIGH9420
Using these schooling category distinctions, the extended earnings
function is derived from expression (A.2) as:
A.3)  Ln(E 8)  = Ln(E 0)  +  (r 1 K,)S,
+  (r2 K2)(S, + S2)
+ (r3K3)(S + S2+ S 3)
+  (r 4 K 4 )(SI+S 2 +S 3 + S4),
= Ln(E 0) +  b,D, +  b2D 2 +  b3D3 +  b4D4
where the b 1 's refer to the coefficient estimates in Table A2 associated with each Dummy
variable, Di , and the Si 's  refer to the number of years needed for moving from schooling
level i-I to level i.  The estimation of this earnings functions using Dummy variables
(such that each individual is only associated with a single Dummy =1)", yields the
coefficients presented in Table A2. To derive the average rates of return from these.
coefficients, it is first necessary to deflate them by the corresponding S's and K's shown
in the equation above. [For example, r, =  bl/ (KISI).]
Table A3 presents the cumulative number of years in school used for each
schooling category to derive the r1's according to the preceding formula. These figures do
not take into account repetition rates, which break the one-to-one correspondence
between years spent in school versus schooling level attained. Instead, Table A3 assumes
that persons who reported having completed a particular schooling level spent the
minimum time needed to attain that level, while persons who did not complete a certain
level were assigned a schooling time that is half-way between having completed the
previous level without repetition and completing  the next level." 8
Table A3: Assumed Average Years of Schooling
Wage Earners  Monet. Inc. Recip.
School Attainment Levels  1984  1994  1984  1994
0 - Less than Primary complete  2.21  2.07  2.21  1.93
1 - Primary and some Secondary  6.21  6.20  6.21  6.18
2 - Secondary and some Preparatory  9.18  9.14  9.18  9.29
3 - Preparatory and some University  12.76  12.78  12.85  12.80
4 - University complete and above  16.03  16.08  16.03  16.08
Note:  It is assumed that completion of  primary, secondary, preparatory and
university levels takes 6, 9, 12 and 16 years.
17  An altemative procedure would have been to assign dummy variables for each level of education
completed, such that some individuals will have a positive Dummy assigned to them more than once.
A person whose maximum attainment is the preparatory level, for example, would count as positive
in three Dummy variables (primary, secondary, preparatory) under that procedure, while under the
present procedure he only counts positive once, in D 3.
Is The procedure was chosen for lack of conveniently  available data for making the requisite adjustments,
in full recognition that it may result in important  biases that overestimate the true rates of return (see
Behrman and Deolalikar, 1991). One extenuating  circumstance in favor of this procedure is that the
focus of this report is mainly on the change in the rates of return of education over time, rather than
on their absolute value.  Although this too will yield biases so long as repetition and drop-out rates do
not remain constant over time, the impact will not be as strong.21
The rates of return (the ri 's) in equation (A.3) represent average rates of
return to education over the entire period that it takes to reach a certain schooling level.
The marginal rate of return (denoted as m.) obtained by moving from one level of
schooling to the next, however, can be easily derived by expressing the average rate as
the weighted sum of marginal rates. For example, the dummy coefficient for having at
least completed  the secondary  level,  b2 = (r2 K2)(SI + S2) =  (r1 K,)S,  +  (m2 K2 )S 2 =  b,
+  (m 2 K2 )S2,  so that the unadjusted marginal return for investing in secondary education
is m2 K2 = (b 2 - bY)1S 2. The private and social rates of return to education are derived
from these unadjusted marginal rates by dividing through with the appropriate Ki.  The
appropriate K for each level i can be expressed as:
A.4)  Private K  =  KP =  (xE 1 ., + C,P)/Ei-l
A.5)  Social K  =  K,s =  (xEi1 + CiP + Cg )/ E 1. =  KiP +  (C 1g  / EiI).
In the above notation, the private cost of education is composed of C 1P,  which denotes an
individual's private out-of-pocket expenses associated with one year of schooling to
reach schooling level i, and of xEi 1l, which denotes the level of earnings foregone by a
student with schooling level i-1 that is studying to reach schooling level i.  The variable x
ranges between 0 and 1, and measures the extent to which a student is able to work part-
time while attending school (in inverse fashion). A standard convention in previous work
is that if a student has full-time employment, he does not forego any earnings and x = 0.
This convention, however, fails to recognize the private cost in terms of foregone leisure.
Finally, the social cost of education consists of the private costs plus Cig,  which denotes
the government's expenses per year to advance one student to level i.
Private Rates of Return. Table 5 earlier presented the private marginal
rates of return derived under the assumption that the private K's  (equation A.4) are equal
to 1 for all education levels. This assumption is based on two considerations: first, it
assumes that students on average value their leisure at the same rate as the wage foregone
by studying.  That means that if a student works while going to school he is giving up an
amount of leisure that is worth the same as the amount of earnings given up by a student
who decides not to work while going to school. The second assumption is that out-of-
pocket private expenses of going to school are negligible, as suggested by Figure 3,
which shows that the overwhelming share of direct expenditures on education is
accounted for by the federal government. (This assumption is reviewed further below.)
Social Rates of Return.  The social rates of return to education are
obtained by taking into account the total cost of the investment associated with moving
an individual from one education category to the next, independent of whether these costs
are borne by the individual or the government. As derived here, they do not contemplate
any externalities that might be associated with different levels of education. Table 6
reported the social marginal rates of return to education. They were derived by dividing
the private rates in Table 5 by the social K's shown in equation (A.5), again under the
assumption that the private K's are equal to one.  (The public cost ratio, C,S/Ei. 1, was
obtained for different schooling levels from the information contained in Tables 2 and 3.)22
Note that as long as the the private individual does not bear all the costs involved with
education (i.e., Cig  / Ei-l  >  0), the social rates of return will by construction always be
lower than the private rates of return, which is borne out in a comparison of Tables 5 and
Table 6.
Estimated Private Costs of Schooling in 1994
The information in Figure 3 was taken from official reports that may have
underestimated  the total private out-of-pocket costs associated with investments in
education. This Annex provides a separate estimate of private costs of schooling using
the income-expenditure  survey of 1994.  ENIGH94 provides information on direct
outlays associated with schooling by level (pre-primary, primary, secondary, preparatory
and university) in each family, together with spending on schooling articles that is not
broken down by level. In Annex Table A4, these last costs are divided up across different
schooling levels in proportion to the direct outlays. The resulting total of private
expenditures on education is then divided by an estimate of the number of students
attending at each level. According to these figures, private spending accounted for about
27 percent of total spending on education in 1994. These private costs of education are
still fairly modest in terms of average earnings, but turn out to be significant when
compared to the earnings of workers without experience, which may be a more
appropriate comparison for a student deciding whether to continue his studies to a certain
level or begin working without completing his degree.
Annex Table A4: Private  Spending on Education in Mexico, 1994
Private  Expenditures  As  share  of annual  earnings  of workers  with  prior  level  of
Per  Student  schooling  attainment:
(1994  Pesos)  Ave.  1994  Earnings  Workers  w/o  experience
__________  ______________  W&  S  Monet.  Inc.  W&S  Monet.  Inc.
Prinary  617.2  8.0%  7.4%  26.8%  29.8%
Secondary  1081.6  9.6%  8.2%  28.0%  27.6%
Preparatory  1625.6  11.5%  10.2%  27.1%  26.0%
University  3,369.4  13.1%  12.1%  31.0%  29.1%
average  1047.0  6.3%  6.2%
Total Students
in sample  Non-working  (%/6) Working  (%/)  Ave.  hrs/week
Primary  8131  97.6%  2.4%  43.0
Secondary  3374  91.3%  8.7%  31.3
Preparatory  1940  82.8%  17.2%  34.6
University  970  70.8%  29.2%  36.7
Total  14415  92.3%  7.7%  36.5
Source:  Own  calculations  from  ENIGH94.  To  calculate  the  spending  shares,  average  1994 Earnings  are
from  Table  2 and  the  earnings  of  workers  without  experience  are  calculated  from  the  earnings  function
coefficients  in Table  A2.
The lower half of  Annex Table A4, shows the proportion of students that
work, at least part-time, while going to school. The overall low figure of 7.7 percent is23
strongly influenced by the primary level average, which comprises more than half of all
students included in the survey. As we move up the schooling levels, part -time
employment becomes much more significant. At the highest level, an estimated 29.2
percent of all students attending university are working an average of 36.7 hours per
week. Although these figures are often used to calculate the total private opportunity cost
of going to school, this paper ignores that approach on the assumption that the earnings
from part-time work are offset by the loss of leisure of equal value.
Annex Table A5 presents the private and social rates of return for wage
earners after taking into account the private costs of education suggested above. Instead
of being equated to one, the 'private K' from equation (A.4) is now equal to 1 plus the
ratio of the private outlays per student from Table A5, divided by the average income of
persons with schooling levels one category below the one being aspired to by the student.
(Furthermore, it is assumed that the resulting ratio applies also in 1984.) The private rate
of return is then obtained by dividing the rates in Table 5 by this new private K, and
similarly, the social rates of return are derived by revising the values for the 'social K'
with these revised private K's.  The results in Table A5 indicate that the basic conclusions
derived earlier about the tendency toward a reduced dispersion of social rates of return in
1994 do not change substantially with these revisions.
Annex Table A5: Revised Private and Public Rates of Return to Education
Based on average foregone  Based on foregone
Schooling level  earnings; Table 2  earnings of workers with
no experience; estimates
from Table A2.
=___________  1984  1994  1984  1994
Private Rates
1  -primary  15.6%  12.8%  13.3%  10.9%
2- secondary  12.7%  15.2%  10.9%  13.0%
3- preparatory  13.9%  16.3%  12.2%  14.3%
4- university  9.1%  17.6%  7.9%  15.2%
Social Rates
1- primary  14.4%  10.5%  10.8%  6.5%
2- secondary  11.3%  12.2%  8.1%  8.0%
3- preparatory  11.7%  12.2%  8.7%  8.7%
4- university  7.0%  12.1%  5.4%  8.1%
The Effects of Higher Wage Dispersion on the Returns to Education
Exogenous changes in the dispersion of wages alter the private rates of
return to education. In the absence of any policy responses, they will also change the
social rates of return in the same proportion. To see this, note from expressions (A.4) and
(A.5), that the social rate of return of investing in education level i can be expressed as a
function of the private rates of return:
rn;  =  r PKjP =  r 1SKYS  =  riS  [Y( 1P  +  (Cig/Ei- )].24
After dividing through by K,P,  this yields:
M/K"p  =  r,p  =  r 1s [ 1 + (Cig/Ej,  )/K,P]  ri  [1 + GJi,
where G 1 is a positive function of the amount of government spending per student in
level i of education.  For simplicity's sake, assume that KJ,  remains constant over time." 9
Then by taking logs and differentiating, we obtain that,
A.6)  dn1/m,  _  driP/  ri  =  d r1 s/ r 1
5 +  dGi /[l  +  GJ.
As observed earlier, over the interval from 1984 to 1994, the real wages of persons with
university education increased proportionately much more than the real wages of workers
with primary and secondary education. This means that the private rates of return for
higher levels of education would increase by more than for the lower levels; or using the
notation in expression (A.6), dr,P/  r"P  > dr 1.1P/  ri.,P. If the government were not to change
its resource allocation across the different education levels (i.e., dG; = 0), then the social
rates of return would also adjust by the same proportion and in the same direction as the
change in private rates of return.
Alternatively, assume that the government were applying a policy rule to
maintain the social rates of return constant across education levels (the efficient rule
discussed earlier). That would mean that dG; would have to adjust in the same proportion
as the change in private rates of return.  In Mexico's case, the increase in the rate of return
to higher education would have to be met with an increase of G in higher education,
while the decline in the rate of return to primar,  education would have to be met with a
reduction of G at the primary level.  Only that way will the social rates of return be
maintained equal in the face of diverging movements in the private rates of return. Such
a policy response in G, however, also tends to exacerbate income inequalities, at least in
the short run, for the reasons discussed in Section E.
Annex Table A6:
Revealed Response to Change in Private  Rates of Return,  1984-1994
Wages & Salaries  Monetary  Income
Proportional change in:  proportional change in:
Schooling level  private  R  social  R  G  private  R  social  R  G
1-primary complete  -18.3%  -27.1%  8.8%  -2.7%  -13.9%  11.2%
2 - secondary  complete  20.1%  4.8%  15.3%  10.3%  -3.1%  13.4%
3-preparatorycomplete  17.4%  2.3%  15.1%  33.3%  18.0%  15.0%
4 - university  and above  76.7%  73.7%  3.0%  60.9%  44.8%  16.1%
Source:  Calculated  from  Tables  5 and  Table  6.
Table A6 shows the actual response that took place in Mexico: even
though the private rates of return moved in divergent directions -- rates on primary
19 This  assumption  is less  heroic  than  might  appear,  since  it merely  implies  that  the  share  of a full  year's
income  that  would  be foregone  by continuing  to study  [i.e.,  variable  x in  expression  (3.4)]  remains
constant  and  that  private  out  of  pocket  expenses  move  in line  with  earnings  over  time.25
education declined, while rates on higher levels increased -- Government spending
increased at all levels, indicating that the "efficient" expenditure adjustment rule was not
followed. This apparent "egalitarian" response is consistent with the earlier observation
in Table 4, that per capita federal spending on different schooling levels had become
more equal in recent years.  The unfortunate consequence of an egalitarian response is
that relatively fewer resources become invested in the education levels with the highest
rates of return, which eventually becomes translated into lower productivity growth.26
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